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Note
Modernizing Medicare:
Protecting America's Most Vulnerable Patients
from Predatory Health Care Marketing Through
Accessible Legal Remedies
Elizabeth C. Borer*
Seventy-four-year-old T.W. Aldridge of Mississippi woke up
one day to discover that his Medicare health plan was switched
from a government-insured plan to a private Medicare Advan-
tage plan.1 An insurance salesman forged Mr. Aldridge's signa-
ture to collect a $300 commission, thereby enrolling Mr. Al-
dridge in a health plan that his doctors would not accept. 2 Mr.
Aldridge, ailing and in need of medical care, accrued over
$40,000 in out-of-pocket expenses while enrolled in a private
Medicare Advantage plan. 3 He spent months trying to get off
the private plan by continually telephoning and submitting let-
ters to Medicare and the insurance company. 4 After his long
struggle, Mr. Aldridge's plan was finally switched back to orig-
inal Medicare-unfortunately, the change came eleven days af-
ter he died.5
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University of Minnesota. The author thanks Professors Prentiss Cox and Su-
san Bartlett Foote for their guidance. She is also grateful to the dedicated edi-
tors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, with special thanks to Jenni Vai-
nik, Lindsey Yock, Carrie Ryan Gallia, and Brian Dawley. Finally, the author
thanks her grandparents and her parents, Jane Canney and George Borer, for
providing her with many privileges and opportunities. Copyright © 2008 by
Elizabeth C. Borer.
1. Armen Keteyian, Trapped in the Private Medicare Maze, CBS NEWS,
July 17, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2007/07/17/cbsnews-
investigates/printable306733O.shtml.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
1165
1166 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1165
Disturbingly, stories like Mr. Aldridge's are becoming in-
creasingly common throughout the United States. 6 In Califor-
nia, insurance agents made an unscheduled visit to a subsi-
dized housing complex where they enrolled elderly Chinese-
Americans with limited English proficiency in private Medicare
plans.7 Forty-four of these residents were enrolled in private
plans without understanding that neither their doctors nor the
county hospital accepted the private plans.8 In other instances,
agents enrolled mentally disabled persons without consulting
their guardians and even signed up deceased persons for pri-
vate Medicare plans.9 Tens of thousands of Medicare beneficia-
ries have been victimized by the deceptive sales tactics of in-
surers running Medicare's huge private plan options. 10 Recent
audits of the Medicare program document widespread viola-
tions of patients' rights and consumer protection standards."
Such violations directly impact the health of patients by delay-
ing access to urgently needed medications 12 or denying cover-
age of medical treatments.' 3
6. See, e.g., Robert Pear, For Recipients of Medicare, the Hard Sell, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, at Al (describing the persistent problem of aggressive
Medicare marketing throughout the country).
7. Robert Pear, Hard Sell Cited as Insurers Push Plans to Elderly, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2007, at A18.
8. See Letter from Clare Crawford & Michael Keys, Staff Attorneys, Bay
Area Legal Aid, to Leslie V. Norwalk, Acting Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Me-
dicaid Servs. (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.nsclc.org/areas/medicare
-part-d/area folder.2006-09-28.5758698482/areafolder.2006- 10-12
.2022247391/article.2007-03-13.2062873155/atdownloadlattachment.
9. Insurers Suspend the Marketing of Some Medicare Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2007, at C2.
10. Robert Pear, Medicare Audits Show Problems in Private Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at Al.
11. Id.; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., No. OEI-01-05-00130, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE MARKETING MATERIALS
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2005, at 12 (2006), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/
reports/oei-01-05-00130.pdf (concluding from audits in fiscal year 2005 that
some private plans were not in compliance with federal marketing regula-
tions).
12. Pear, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Predatory Sales Practices in Medicare Advantage: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Oversight & Investiga-
tions Hearing] (hearings audio file) (statement of Brenda Clegg-Boodram, Res-
ident, D.C. Housing Authority Property for Senior and Disabled People of Low
Income), http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte mtgs 110-oi-hrg.062607
.MedicareAdvantage.shtml (describing how a fellow resident was denied medi-
cal treatment for multiple sclerosis while enrolled in a Medicare Advantage
plan).
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Medicare Advantage and Part D prescription drug plans
are private health-benefit options approved by Medicare but
sold and administered by private insurance companies. 14 Al-
though these plans are not administered by the government,
they are still considered part of the Medicare program, and
companies who sell them must be approved by the federal gov-
ernment. 15 The programs were created as part of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003,16 and coverage became effective on
January 1, 2006.17 Since that time, abuse of seniors has
grown.' 8 This problem is not limited to a few rogue insurance
agents, as companies offering the plans frequently intimate. 19
Rather, insurers provide lucrative incentives to producers who
sell private Medicare products 20 and often fail to appropriately
train or supervise their agents.21
Abusive marketing problems are aggravated by insufficient
regulations and federal enforcement failures. 22 Current Medi-
14. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICARE & You 37-38 (2007), http://www.medicare.govlPublicationsl
Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27 (2000 & Supp. V 2007) (delineating the re-
quirements for federal contracts with insurers offering Medicare Advantage
plans); id. § 1395w-112 (providing the requirements for federal contracts with
prescription drug plan sponsors).
16. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101.
18. Compare Robert Pear, Insurers' Tactics in Marketing Drug Plan Draw
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 33 (quoting a federal official who
stated there had been about one hundred reported complaints of aggressive
marketing of prescription drug plans before the benefit went into effect), with
Pear, supra note 10 (indicating that by the fall of 2007 "tens of thousands" of
beneficiaries were victims of predatory marketing).
19. See Robert Pear, Oklahoma Chides Insurer in Medicare Marketing
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A14 (quoting an executive from an insur-
ance organization as saying, "[a] few bad apples have been behaving unethical-
ly").
20. See, e.g., Medicare Advantage Marketing and Sales: WVho Has the Ad-
vantage?: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 19 (2007)
[hereinafter Aging Hearing] (statement of Sean Dilweg, Insurance Comm'r,
Wisconsin) (noting that an insurer paid agents commissions ranging from $50
to $250 for private Medicare plan sales).
21. Pear, supra note 19.
22. See 153 CONG. REC. S10,153 (daily ed. July 26, 2007) (statement of
Sen. Kohl) (explaining that the exclusive authority of the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services to investigate and discipline the marketing and selling
of private Medicare plans has left a "sizeable enforcement gap" that has ex-
acerbated marketing abuses).
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care marketing guidelines lack comprehensive protections for
beneficiaries. 23 Unfortunately, these weak regulations preempt
stronger state law protections. 24 Inaction by federal regulatory
agencies, coupled with broad preemption of state law creates a
legal fissure in which vulnerable Medicare patients are pitted
against wealthy private insurers without accessible legal ave-
nues for relief.
This Note offers solutions to the weak regulation and en-
forcement gaps that facilitate marketing abuse. Current legis-
lative proposals to predatory marketing problems fall short in
providing the appropriate relief needed by victimized Medicare
beneficiaries. 25 This Note does not engage in the political de-
bate over the validity of privatizing Medicare's benefit pack-
ages. 26 Rather, it contends that as long as Medicare offers pri-
vate benefits, government authorities are responsible for
protecting patients from unscrupulous marketing behavior.
Part I of this Note examines the development of the Medicare
program, the movement to privatize benefits, and the expan-
sive preemption of state authority under the Medicare law.
Part II analyzes the current law and discusses legislation in-
troduced to remedy the abusive marketing crisis, ultimately
arguing that the measures do not offer enough protection for
beneficiaries. Part III draws from the strengths of consumer
protection theories to recommend legislative reforms. Specifi-
cally, this Note proposes delegating enforcement authority to
states, employing existing state consumer protections, creating
23. Under current regulations, insurers may engage in sales practices
generally considered inappropriate for senior citizens, such as cold-calling and
cross-selling unrelated insurance products. See Aging Hearing, supra note 20,
at 19-20 (statement of Sean Dilweg, Insurance Comm'r, Wisconsin).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-26(b)(3), -112(g) (Supp. V 2007) (preempting all
state laws and regulations related to private Medicare plans).
25. See Accountability and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of
2007, S. 1883, 110th Cong. (2007); Accountability and Transparency in Medi-
care Marketing Act of 2007, H.R. 4790, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007); Preventing
Medicare Seniors from Being Confused Due to Abusive Marketing (Prevent
Medicare SCAMs) Act of 2007, H.R. 2307, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
26. For discussions on the values and demerits of privatizing Medicare
benefits, see Susan Adler Channick, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Im-
provement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Will It Be Good Medicine for U.S.
Health Policy?, 14 ELDER L.J. 237, 241-45 (2006) (critiquing privatization),
and Mark Schlesinger & Jacob S. Hacker, Secret Weapon: The "New" Medicare
as a Route to Health Security, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 247, 282-84
(2007) (arguing that Medicare's public-private hybrid gives the program flex-
ibility).
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a private cause of action for consumer redress, and enhancing
violation penalties.
I. THE CREATION, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF
MEDICARE
Medicare is the largest public health care program in the
United States.27 Since its inception in 1965, Medicare has pro-
vided health coverage for our nation's most vulnerable pa-
tients.28 Originally modeled on the Social Security benefit and
European social welfare programs, 29 Medicare recently ex-
panded private plan options in a shift towards market-based
health care.30
A. "SOCIALIZED MEDICINE" AND THE RISE OF GOVERNMENT-
SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
Notably demonized by opposition groups as "socialized
medicine,"3 1 the enactment of Medicare reflected the culmina-
tion of an epochal political struggle that raged across the coun-
try for more than a generation. 32 The Medicare Act was finally
passed in 1965. 33 Medicare continues to come under sharp criti-
cism, 34 but the program remains considerably popular among
Americans. 35
27. See MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE: A POLICY PRIMER 1 (2006) (stating
that Medicare is also one of the fastest growing programs in the national
budget).
28. According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
the federal agency charged with administering Medicare, over 42 million el-
derly and disabled persons received Medicare benefits in 2005. See Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Enrollment: All Beneficiaries as of July
2005, http://www.cms.hhs.govfMedicareEnRpts/ (follow "2005 and All" hyper-
link) (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
29. See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Struggle for the Soul of Medicare, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 410, 411 (2004).
30. See Remarks by the President at the Signing of the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1694,
1696-97 (Dec. 8, 2003) (praising the new Medicare legislation for providing
beneficiaries with choices between private plans).
31. See RICHARD HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST 2 (1966).
32. See id. at 2-3 (noting that opposition forces spent almost $50 million
in national campaigns); MONTE M. POEN, HARRY S. TRUMAN VERSUS THE
MEDICAL LOBBY 1-28 (1979) (detailing conflicts over health security beginning
in 1915).
33. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97,
79 Stat. 290 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Introduction to DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDI-
CARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES, at xi, xii (2006) (criticizing Medicare as a
20081 1169
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Medicare has achieved substantial success in providing
health care to some of America's most vulnerable citizens. 36
Medicare improved access to health care. 37 Before Medicare,
only about half of all older Americans had health insurance38
and senior citizens were increasingly harmed by the rising
costs of health care. 39 Medicare almost immediately doubled
the share of elderly citizens with insurance. 40 Medicare's bene-
fit package has changed little since 1965,41 although private in-
surance companies have gained increased prominence in the
program. 42
"multi-trillion-dollar mistake that encapsulates all that is wrong with the
modern social welfare state").
35. See MOON, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that Medicare is one of the
most popular public programs and gets higher marks from its beneficiaries
than most private health insurance companies serving the younger popula-
tion); Vladeck, supra note 29, at 410-11 (noting that Medicare remains popu-
lar among Americans of all ages and socioeconomic status).
36. Persons eligible for Medicare include patients age sixty-five and over,
persons with disabilities, and end-stage renal disease patients. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395c (2000).
37. Medicare played an important role in desegregating medical facilities.
See Robert M. Ball, Reflections on How Medicare Came About, in MEDICARE:
PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 27, 27-28 (Robert D.
Reischauer et al. eds., 1998) (stating that when the author was the Medicare
Commissioner during the program's first seven years, not only were hospitals
required to submit desegregation plans, but Medicare inspectors would inves-
tigate facilities to determine whether integration was actually occurring).
38. MOON, supra note 27, at 2.
39. See RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH FOR A
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY 53 (1986) (noting that elderly Americans often
had low incomes, faced higher health insurance premiums, lacked employer
contributions, and required more medical attention).
40. By 1970, ninety-seven percent of older Americans were enrolled in the
Medicare program, and that proportion has remained steady since. MOON, su-
pra note 27, at 2.
41. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE 364 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining that the Medicare benefits pack-
age still closely resembles the standard package available in the mid-1960s).
42. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (creating private managed care op-
tions); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (creating private prescription drug plans and expanding private ma-
naged care options).
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B. MEDICARE REFORM AND INCREASED PRIVATIZATION OF THE
PROGRAM
Medicare is divided into four parts. Part A covers the cost
of hospital care43 and Part B pays for physician services and
outpatient care. 44 Parts A and B are incorporated in the tradi-
tional fee-for-service program, or "Original Medicare," in which
the government serves as the insurer.45 In 1997, Congress add-
ed Part C, initially known as the 'Medicare+Choice" program 46
and now recognized as 'Medicare Advantage."47 Part C plans
are approved by Medicare and offer the same coverage availa-
ble under Parts A and B.48 However, Part C plans are managed
and administered by private companies. 49 Part D is the pre-
scription drug program created in 2003.50 Part D is also admi-
nistered entirely by private companies. 51
1. Private Plan Options
Medicare has a history of cooperation with private insur-
ers. 52 Introduced to expand plan choices, 53 private plans were
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000) (describing Part A hospital coverage).
44. See id. § 1395k (describing the scope of benefits under Part B).
45. Under Original Medicare, the federal government acts as an insurance
company by bearing the risk for the costs of the basic benefit package. MOON,
supra note 27, at 3. Part A is funded by payroll taxes and a portion of the taxa-
tion of Social Security benefits. Id. at 4. Similarly, Part B is funded by benefi-
ciary-paid premiums and general revenues that mostly come from personal
income taxes. Id. at 3-4.
46. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. See 10 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000 & Supp. V 2007) (noting that references to
'Medicare+Choice" refer to 'Medicare Advantage or MA" as provided in sec-
tion 201(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modification
Act of 2005 and set out as a note under 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2000 & Supp. V
2007)).
48. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (detailing benefits available under Part
C).
49. See, e.g., id. § 1395w-27 (describing guidelines for contracting with or-
ganizations to offer Part C plans); see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., supra note 14, at 38.
50. Part D provisions of the Act are codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w.
51. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111 to -112 (codifying bid submission
rules, contract regulations, and other general requirements for insurers offer-
ing Part D prescription drug plans).
52. See Michael J. Jackonis, Jr., Considerations in Medicare Reform: The
Impact of Medicare Preemption on State Laws, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 185
(2004) (explaining that Medicare has offered coverage through managed care
organizations since 1972).
53. See Geraldine Dallek et al., Lessons from Medicare+Choice for Medi-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
intended to hold down treatment expenses by incorporating
managed care components and reducing premiums through
private competition. 54 Under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, 55 integrated health systems
offering Medicare managed care plans were paid on a full-risk
basis and required savings to be passed on to beneficiaries in
the form of increased benefits or reduced cost sharing, used for
future benefits, or refunded to Medicare. 56 A significant effort
to expand enrollment in private plans occurred with the pas-
sage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which created the
Medicare+Choice program.5 7
The Medicare+Choice program encountered many prob-
lems, including overly complicated options that hindered bene-
ficiaries' ability to make informed choices. 58 Unstable health
provider participation also caused many private companies to
leave the Medicare program. 59 Despite the intent of the pro-
gram to reduce costs, the private plans were more expensive for
the government than traditional Medicare. 60 These problems
led to legislative reform of the program.
In 2003, Congress reformed the troubled Medicare+Choice
program by passing the Medicare Modernization Act 61 (MMA),
which renamed the program "Medicare Advantage."62 The Act
expanded managed care and established a system of managed
competition between private insurers and the government. 63
Medicare Advantage plans, administered by private companies,
care Reform, COMMONWEALTH FUND, June 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/usrdoc/Dallek-lessonsM+C_658.pdf?
section=4039.
54. MOON, supra note 27, at 111-12.
55. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 (2000 & Supp. V 2007)).
56. Jackonis, supra note 52, at 187.
57. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
58. See Dallek et al., supra note 53, at 4-5.
59. Between 1999 and 2003, more than 2.4 million beneficiaries were af-
fected by plan withdrawals and overall enrollment in Medicare+Choice ma-
naged care plans dropped by 1.4 million beneficiaries. Id. at 3.
60. See id. at 6-7.
61. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
63. Melissa M. Ostrowski, Recent Development, Medicare Advantage Pri-
vate Fee-for-Service Plans: What Privatization Means for Today's Beneficiaries,
8 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 375, 378 (2007).
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provide hospital and primary care coverage, and many plans
offer additional benefits not available under the government-
insured Medicare plans.64 Unlike its predecessor, the Medicare
Advantage program offers no appearance of cost control. 65 In
fact, the MMA provides a series of financial subsidies designed
to attract private insurers to the Medicare market.66
The MMA also created a long-awaited prescription drug
program 67 available to all Medicare beneficiaries, known as
Part D.68 Enamored with market approaches to health care
coverage and perhaps eager to protect the interests of heavy po-
litical contributors such as drug manufacturers, insurance
companies, and managed care organizations, 69 lawmakers de-
signed the Part D prescription drug benefit as a program en-
tirely administered by private insurers.70
2. Profitability for the Private Health Care Industry
Private insurers have an opportunity to make a lot of mon-
ey off Medicare plans. Rather than encouraging plans to offer
more benefits at less cost,7 1 the government now pays private
plans more than the traditional government-sponsored plan. 72
64. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 14, at 33, 35,
38 (describing extra benefits such as coverage for vision, hearing, dental, and
general wellness programs).
65. Jonathan Oberlander, Through the Looking Glass: The Politics of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 32 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 187, 204 (2007).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
67. In the wake of rising drug costs, Judge Selya criticized Medicare's lack
of prescription drug coverage, noting that "[i]f social programs are meant to
furnish a safety net, Medicare is a notoriously porous one. A main cause of this
porosity is that most outpatient prescription drugs are not covered." Mass.
Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 177 (1st Cir. 1999).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 to -152.
69. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 41, at 367; see also Remarks Following
a Meeting on Prescription Drug Benefits, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 511
(Apr. 23, 2007) (highlighting the success of the MMA by praising the principles
of competition incorporated in the program).
70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-112 (articulating the requirements for
contracts with prescription drug plan sponsors).
71. Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, Structuring Choice Under Medicare,
in MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note
37, at 75, 76-77 (describing the competitive health care delivery system en-
couraged under TEFRA that emphasized cost savings for the government and
greater benefits for patients).
72. Marsha Gold, Private Plans in Medicare: Another Look, 24 HEALTH
AFF. 1302, 1303 (2005) (stating that on average, a Medicare Advantage plan
will receive about 108% of what Medicare pays for the same beneficiary in the
2008] 1173
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"Under the Medicare Advantage program, the government pays
insurers an average of $9,000 a year for each person enrolled in
a private plan."73 Medicare payments to private health plans
increased by a record 10.6% in 2004, in an effort to persuade
the plans to enter the expanded Medicare market. 74 Federal of-
ficials and members of Congress said they hoped that the in-
crease, five times as large as the typical annual increase, would
stop private plans from deserting the Medicare program. 75 High
payments to insurers offering private Medicare plans continue
today.7 6 Private plans have an incentive to enter the Medicare
market and to do well within it. However, the government is ul-
timately responsible for overseeing the operation of Medicare. 77
C. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEDICARE MARKETING
1. Federal Oversight and Regulation of Private Medicare
Plans
Private health plans are not considered public actors for
the purposes of the procedural due process clause, 78 but are
still subject to government oversight. Federal statutes provide
for the coordinated administration of the Medicare Prescription
Drug and Medicare Advantage programs by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).79 Private plans are re-
quired to submit all marketing materials to CMS for review,8 0
and the agency has established detailed marketing guide-
traditional fee-for-service program).
73. Pear, supra note 6.
74. See Robert Pear, Private Health Plans to Receive Record Increase from
Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at Al (noting that the Bush administra-
tion wanted to triple enrollment in private plans within three years of passing
the MMA).
75. Id.
76. See Medicare Participants Face a 3% Rise in Premiums, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/484/story/
1458330.html (noting that high payments to private insurers in October 2007
contributed to premium increases for beneficiaries).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-9 (Supp. V 2007) (describing the administration
of Medicare).
78. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 43-44, 60 (1999)
(holding that private health plans are not state actors for the purposes of the
Due Process Clause).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-9.
80. 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.80, 423.50 (2006) (regulating the approval of market-
ing materials and enrollment forms for Medicare Advantage and Part D
plans).
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lines.8 1 Part D plans, for example, are prohibited from certain
specific marketing activities such as inducing enrollment
through remunerations, soliciting Medicare beneficiaries door-
to-door, and engaging in activities that could mislead or confuse
Medicare beneficiaries.8 2 Similar requirements exist for Medi-
care Advantage plans.8 3
In the spring of 2007, CMS announced that seven insur-
ance companies voluntarily suspended marketing their private
Medicare health plans.8 4 The decision came after increased re-
ports that insurance agents tricked elderly customers into buy-
ing policies they could not afford.8 5 Three months later, the big-
gest private providers of Medicare coverage were cleared to
resume marketing their Medicare Advantage plans.8 6 CMS has
begun imposing fines on insurers,8 7 but senior citizen advocates
continue to question the agency's commitment to protecting be-
neficiaries.8 8
Commentators criticize CMS for not adequately protecting
patients against marketing abuses.8 9 In particular, critics are
81. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE MARKETING
GUIDELINES FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, 1876 COST PLANS (2d
rev. 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/
Downloads/FinalMarketingGuidelines.pdf.
82. 42 C.F.R. § 423.50(f).
83. See id. § 422.80.
84. See Insurers Suspend the Marketing of Some Medicare Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2007, at C2.
85. See id.
86. See Medicare Advantage Marketing OK'd, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.), Sept. 24, 2007, available at http://www.startribune.com/535/story/
1443559.html (noting that UnitedHealth Group Inc., Humana, Inc., Blue
Cross-Blue Shield of Tennessee, and Aon Corporation's Sterling Life Insurance
Co. had all been approved to market their Medicare Advantage plans).
87. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ENFORCEMENT AC.
TIONS AGAINST MEDICARE ADVANTAGE ORGANIZATIONS AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUG SPONSORS: JANUARY 2006-JANUARY 2008 (2008), http://www.cms.hhs
.gov/MCRAdvPArtDEnrolData/Downloads/EnforcementActions._Web.pdf (list-
ing all enforcement actions by CMS since January 2006, which include two
instances of fines levied against plans for marketing violations).
88. See, e.g., DAVID LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., CAL. HEALTH ADVOCS., THE RE.
LUCTANT REGULATOR: CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES' RE.
SPONSE TO MARKETING MISCONDUCT BY MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS 2
(2007), http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/_pdf/advocacy/2007/CHA-MRC-
Regulator-2007-07.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Letter from John D. Dingell, Henry Waxman, Charles Ran-
gel, Sherrod Brown, & Pete Stark, Representatives, United States Congress,
to Dr. Mark B. McClellan, Adm'r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept.
7, 2006), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-b_senior_
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concerned that generous payments to private plans encourage
predatory sales practices because every enrollee is a potential
source of profit for private plans. 90 Others note that CMS lacks
the resources necessary to respond to widespread marketing
abuses.9 1 State regulators express concern that the current fed-
eral marketing guidelines, crafted by CMS, permit certain
high-pressure sales tactics that are generally considered inap-
propriate for senior citizens, such as cold calls and cross-
selling.92 Insurance commissioners explain that once agents
start talking to seniors about Medicare plans, they often try to
sell unrelated and sometimes unsuitable insurance products
such as annuities, life insurance, and funeral policies. 93
In light of such accusations, the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners (NAIC) requested that CMS require
plan sponsors to restrict how the companies market non-
Medicare products in conjunction with Medicare products, oth-
erwise referred to as "cross-selling."94 However, CMS refused to
place cross-selling restrictions on plan sponsors, 95 stating that
since it does not regulate the sale of non-Medicare insurance
products, the creation of restrictions on cross-selling would be
an "indirect way of regulating products and activities that are
regulated by other governmental entities and, therefore, it is
inappropriate for CMS to create such restrictions." 96 As refe-
renced by this statement, states are usually the government
issues_House_lettertoMcClellan.pdf (expressing concern about abusive
marketing of prescription drug plans).
90. See Pear, supra note 6 (describing high government payments to in-
surers for each private plan enrollee and noting that agent commissions range
as high as $600 for each sale).
91. E.g., Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 47 (statement of Kim Holland,
Insurance Comm'r, Oklahoma).
92. See id. at 18-21 (statement of Sean Dilweg, Insurance Comm'r, Wis-
consin).
93. See id. at 19.
94. Winter 2006 National Meeting, 2006 NAIC PROC. 4TH QTR. 747, 757-
58 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Kansas City, Mo.).
95. CMS responded to concerns about cross-selling by noting, "We do not
want to restrict beneficiaries from receiving materials about health-related
and non-health-related services that may be of benefit to them in managing
their health or payments for health care." Medicare Program; Medicare Pre-
scription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4224 (Jan. 28, 2005).
96. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, supra note 94, at 757 (citing Letter
from Abby L. Block, Dir. of the Ctr. for Beneficiary Choices, Ctrs. for Medicare
and Medicaid Servs., to Jorge Gomez, Chair, Senior Issues Task Force and
Comm'r, Wis. Dep't of Ins., Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs (Dec. 9, 2006)).
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agencies responsible for regulating the sales of most insurance
products. 97
2. State Protection of Beneficiaries
Abusive marketing of private Medicare plans is a growing
concern for state governments. State insurance commissioners
note that the lack of federal enforcement has created "virtual
lawlessness."98 According to a survey conducted in April 2007
by the NAIC, forty-one states reported receiving complaints
about misrepresentations in the marketing and sales of private
Medicare plans.99 Thirty-three states received complaints about
cross-selling non-Medicare products, and thirty-nine states re-
ported complaints about inappropriate or confusing marketing
practices that led beneficiaries to enroll in plans they did not
understand. 100 States use a complaint system as one of the tools
to regulate the insurance industry and protect consumers.
Many states enacted insurance suitability laws requiring
sales agents and insurance companies to determine whether a
particular insurance product is appropriate for a consumer be-
fore selling the product. 101 Some suitability laws only apply to
senior citizen sales, 102 while others do not specify application to
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2000) ("The business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.").
98. See Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 46-47 (statement of Kim Hol-
land, Insurance Comm'r, Oklahoma).
99. NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS SENIOR ISSUES TASK FORCE, STATE
SURVEY ON MEDICARE MARKETING ISSUES: PRELIMINARY RESULTS 2007, at 1
(2007), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees-b-seniorissues_0706_
medicare_advantage-marketing-survey.pdf (noting that surveys were received
from forty-six state departments of insurance and that results differed widely
as many states did not track complaints because their authority is preempted
by the Medicare Modernization Act).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 60K.46, subdiv. 4 (2006) (requiring agents sell-
ing long-term care, annuity, life-endowment, or Medicare supplement insur-
ance to have "reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for the customer" by making "reasonable inquiries to determine sui-
tability" including looking into the customer's income, need for insurance, and
the values, benefits, and costs of the customer's existing insurance program,
when compared to that same qualities of the recommended policy); id.
§ 72A.20, subdiv. 34 (applying similar suitability requirements to insurance
companies).
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.4554 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 628.347 (2004 &
Supp. 2007). A pending bill to amend the Wisconsin statute would remove the
"senior" limitation. S. 294, 2007 Leg., 98th Sess. (Wis. 2007).
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a particular class of persons. 10 3 Suitability laws may have spe-
cific requirements for certain insurance products, such as long-
term care insurance 104 or annuities.10 5 Although beneficiaries
currently seek help from their state governments that have
mechanisms to regulate abusive behavior, state authorities are
struggling to find ways to protect senior citizens in light of the
MMA's broad preemption of state laws.
3. Preemption of State Law
Historically, states exercised their police powers 106 to pro-
tect the health and safety of their citizens,1 0 7 and played a pri-
mary role in the regulation of health care and insurance. 108 In
1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act 0 9 to ensure
continued state authority over the insurance industry in the
wake of a 1944 Supreme Court decision that recognized insur-
ance as an element of interstate commerce.1 10 Although the
McCarran-Ferguson Act grants states broad powers to regulate
insurance, Congress reserved the right to supersede state
law. 1 In fact, the Supreme Court recognized that the federal
government has played an "increasingly significant role" in the
"protection of the health of our people." 112
Federal intervention into the domain of commercial activi-
ties traditionally regulated by the States poses "perhaps our
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 482-1-137 (2007); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:25-
17-7 (2007).
104. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10H-231 (2005 & Supp. 2007).
105. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-805 (2007); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 1115.001 (Vernon 2007).
106. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting that,
when Congress legislates in an area traditionally regulated by states, "we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manif-
est purpose of Congress").
107. The Supreme Court has noted that the states "traditionally have had
great latitude" to legislate as to the "protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort, and quiet of all persons." See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (citing Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62
(1873)).
108. Jackonis, supra note 52, at 201 (explaining that states have historical-
ly regulated health care and insurance).
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
110. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541-46,
553 (1944).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
112. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (referencing the fed-
eral statutes regulating food and drug safety).
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oldest question of constitutional law."113 The Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution provides that federal law shall be the
"supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."'1 14 Courts
have noted that although the power to preempt is "absolute,"
its exercise is "not to be lightly presumed."'1 5 Rather, courts
start with the assumption that the historic powers of the states
are not to be superseded by federal law unless preemption is
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 116
The MMA "significantly altered" the preemption analysis
for private Medicare programs, 117 reversing the presumption
that state laws were not preempted unless specific conditions
were met.1 18 Instead, the MMA provides, "The standards estab-
lished under this [part] shall supersede any State law or regu-
lation," other than State licensing laws or State laws relating to
plan solvency, "with respect to MA [Medicare Advantage] plans
which are offered by MA organizations under this part."1 1 9
These same standards apply to the Part D prescription drug
program.1 20 The MMA's legislative history supports broad
preemption, indicating that the Medicare Advantage program
is a federal program "operated under Federal rules" and state
laws, "do not, and should not apply," with the exception of state
licensing or plan solvency laws. 12'
113. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) ("The constitu-
tional question is as old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the prop-
er division of authority between the Federal Government and the States.").
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
115. E.g., Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176,
177-79 (1st Cir. 1999).
116. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
117. See Jennifer L. Weaver et al., Courts, Regulators Wrestle with Scope of
Part D Preemption, HEALTH LAW., Feb. 2007, at 18, 18 (noting that before the
enactment of the MMA, the presumption was that state law was not
preempted if it did not conflict with a Medicare+Choice requirement and did
not fit into one of four specified categories where preemption was presumed).
118. The MMA amended section 1856(b)(3) of the Social Security Act and
significantly broadened the scope of federal preemption of state law. See Medi-
care Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4588, 4663
(Jan. 28, 2005) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 417 and 422).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (Supp. V 2007).
120. See id. § 1395w-112(g) (stating that the preemption provisions of
§§ 1395w-24(g), 1395w-26(b)(3) also apply to prescription drug plans).
121. H.R. REP. No. 108-391, at 557 (2003), as reprinted in 2003
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1808, 1926.
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CMS similarly asserts that the MMA broadly preempts
state law.122 Because Medicare Advantage and Part D incorpo-
rate the same preemption provision, CMS notes that Congress
clearly intended the programs to operate in the same manner-
that is-the programs are to be regulated solely by federal and
not state rules. 123 In guidance documents for states, CMS
maintains that federal laws preempt state laws applicable to
marketing abuse. 124
Despite the sweeping preemption provisions advocated by
CMS, many states have taken action to protect their citizens.
For example, the New York State Insurance Department issued
an opinion in 2007 stating that the MMA does not preempt all
of New York's insurance laws. 125 In May 2007, the Oklahoma
insurance commissioner conducted the first major investigation
into Medicare marketing, documenting widespread misconduct
by insurance agents and ordering an insurance company to
take corrective action to protect consumers against high-
pressure sales practices. 26 However, any actions states cur-
rently take against insurers depend on the cooperativeness of
the plans themselves since, if raised, a preemption defense will
likely defeat state enforcement actions. 127 While states struggle
to negotiate ways to protect their citizens, 28 individual benefi-
ciaries have challenged the MMA's preemption in court.
122. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70
Fed. Reg. 4588, 4664 (Jan. 28, 2005) (stating that under current federal
preemption authority, states are limited in applying only those requirements
that are directly related to agent licensing laws and may not regulate health
plans); Letter from Abby L. Block, supra note 96 (asserting broad federal au-
thority and limited state jurisdiction).
123. Weaver et al., supra note 117, at 18 (citing Medicare Program; Medi-
care Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4319 (Jan. 28, 2005) (codi-
fied in 42 C.F.R. § 423) and Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug
Benefit, 70 Fed. Reg. 4588, 4664 (Jan. 28, 2005) (codified in 42 C.F.R. § 422)).
124. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Questions and Answers on
Preemption, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/States/Downloads/QnAonPreemption.pdf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
125. Medicare Prescription Drug Program, Use of Adjusters, 20 Op. N.Y.
Ins. Dep't 07-07-20 (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.usl
ogco2007/rg070720.htm (stating that, in addition to being subject to federal
regulations, when a producer solicits and sells private Medicare plans in the
state the agent is also required to follow state laws and regulations).
126. Pear, supra note 19.
127. See Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Heidi Margulis,
Senior Vice President, Humana, Inc.) (asserting that Humana is not subject to
Oklahoma state law under the MMA despite its willingness to comply with the
state insurance commissioner's investigation).
128. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Medicare Private Plans Sub-
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Lawsuits brought by beneficiaries against health plan
companies have largely been impeded by MMA preemption. In
Uhm v. Humana, Inc., a group of senior citizens brought suit
against an insurance company offering a Part D prescription
drug plan.129 The plaintiffs alleged that the company violated
various state laws by fraudulently inducing seniors to sign up
for its prescription drug plan through the use of deceptive mar-
keting tactics. 130 The court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that
the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by the MMA.131
Citing the statutory language 132 and legislative history, 133 the
court also relied on the "comprehensive standards" for market-
ing materials promulgated by CMS to conclude that the MMA
preempted state law. 134 A federal district court in Alabama
used the same reasoning to dismiss a claim brought by seniors
alleging that they were duped into joining a Medicare Advan-
tage plan.1 35 Similarly, the court noted that legislative history
and congressional intent establish that the MMA was intended
to preempt state law in the area of marketing regulation. 36
The First Circuit is the only federal appellate court that
has addressed the preemptive effect of the MMA.137 Although
the court ultimately determined that the health plan at issue
was actually part of the state Medicaid program and thus out-
side the scope of the Medicare preemption provision, 38 the
court did discuss the congressional intent behind the preemp-
tion clause.' 39 Without reaching the issue of whether the MMA
preempts state law, the First Circuit analyzed the plain statu-
tory language and legislative history of the MMA, noting that
express preemption occurs when Congress "unmistakably or-
group, http://www.naic.org/committees b seniorissuesmedicare-private_
plans.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008) (providing links to recent testimony and
debates regarding state regulation of private Medicare products).
129. Uhm v. Humana, Inc., No. C06-0185-RSM, 2006 WL 1587443, at *1
(W.D. Wash. June 2, 2006).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *4.
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id. at *2.
135. Dial v. HealthSpring of Ala., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1353-54 (S.D.
Ala. 2007).
136. Id. at 1355-56.
137. See First Med. Health Plan, Inc. v. Vega-Ramos, 479 F.3d 46, 51-52
(1st Cir. 2007).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) (Supp. V 2007).
139. See Vega-Ramos, 479 F.3d at 51.
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dains" that its enactments alone are to regulate a particular
subject matter and that "state laws regulating that subject
must fail."'140 Few courts have interpreted the MMA's preemp-
tion clause, but the scope of federal preemption has been a par-
ticular concern for states, beneficiaries, and insurers.' 4 '
Courts will likely continue to grapple with state law
preemption under the MMA as beneficiaries push for market-
ing abuse remedies. 142 However, given the likelihood that the
expansive preemption provisions in the plain language of cur-
rent Medicare law will obstruct legal actions, there is little
chance that state laws will be recognized as valid enforcement
tools. Preemption of state law, coupled with federal inaction to
protect beneficiaries from predatory marketing, creates a legal
void in which victimized patients are left without sufficient re-
course.
II. THE FEDERAL MEDICARE LAW FAILS TO PROTECT
VULNERABLE BENEFICIARIES
Victims of marketing abuse need an effective remedy, par-
ticularly since patients unknowingly enroll in plans that limit
their access to necessary medical care. 143 Section A of this Part
argues that current federal marketing regulations do not pro-
vide enough protection against abuse. However, even if federal
marketing rules are substantively improved, Section B con-
tends that CMS is not an effective law enforcer because of its
conflicted interest in promoting private plans. Finally, Section
C analyzes legislative proposals to remedy the status quo, and
140. See id. (citing Mass. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194
F.3d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1999)).
141. Weaver et al., supra note 117, at 18 (noting that a common concern is
the extent to which the MMA preempts state consumer protection statutes,
insurance laws, and pharmacy regulations).
142. For instance, a federal court in Alabama found that beneficiaries'
common-law fraud claims arising from the sale of private Medicare plans were
not completely preempted by federal law. Harris v. Pacificare Life & Health
Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2007). However, the court only
found that there was no federal question basis for removal, and it explicitly
recognized that preemption may still be a defense in state court. See id. at
1294; see also Lassiter v. Pacificare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 2:07-cv-583-
MEF, 2007 WL 4404051 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 13, 2007).
143. See, e.g., Oversight & Investigations Hearing, supra note 13 (state-
ment of Brenda Clegg-Boodram, Resident, D.C. Housing Authority Property
for Senior and Disabled People of Low-Income) (describing the consequences of
denied medical treatment as a result of being misled into joining a Medicare
Advantage plan).
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concludes that a more comprehensive solution is needed to pro-
tect beneficiaries' individual rights.
A. FEDERAL MARKETING REGULATIONS ARE FLAWED
Existing federal marketing guidelines allow insurers to use
confusing and aggressive sales tactics. Under current regula-
tions, insurers may cross-market other insurance products
while selling private Medicare plans.144 Cross-marketing in-
creases the likelihood that beneficiaries will be led to believe
that unsuitable insurance products are endorsed by the Medi-
care program, or even required to receive health benefits. 145 In-
surers eagerly take advantage of the unique cross-selling op-
portunities the MMA creates within the "senior market."'146 For
example, commentators note that cross-marketing encourages
financial service firms, such as banks, to sponsor private Medi-
care plans, 147 which may increase risks of federal privacy law
violations. 148 However, even if cross-selling is eliminated, other
activities that are currently permissible under federal market-
ing regulations are similarly troubling.
Federal regulations permit certain sales tactics that may
be appropriate under other circumstances, but are not suitable
for Medicare patients. For example, under the current regula-
tions, insurers and their agents may cold-call Medicare-eligible
144. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70
Fed. Reg. 4194, 4224 (Jan. 28, 2005) (supporting cross-selling).
145. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1284-85 (explaining the plaintiffs' claim
that they were misled into joining a Medicare Advantage plan because they
believed it was required to receive prescription drug coverage). But see 42
C.F.R. § 422.80(e)(iv) (2006) (prohibiting insurers from claiming that private
plans are recommended or endorsed by the government).
146. Lindsay R. Resnick, Turn Medicare Advantage into Sales Advantage,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 2, available at http://lindsayresnick
.typepad.com/Articles/MedicareTrends.pdf (explaining that prescription drug
plans can be leveraged as an entryway into selling other plans: "[i]f marketers
and advisors give seniors a reason to trust them, they'll have a customer for
life").
147. See CNBC: "Street Signs"--Medicare Extreme Makeover (CNBC televi-
sion broadcast July 26, 2004), available at http://www.mbproject.org/media_
center.php Oinking to a rebroadcast of a CNBC story on cross-marketing op-
portunities for financial institutions).
148. Major sectors of the financial service industry take the position that
they are exempt from the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portabili-
ty and Accountability Act (HIPAA), thereby jeopardizing beneficiaries' health
information. See Joy Pritts, Health Pol'y Inst., Marketing and Privacy Issues:
An Analysis of the MMA and Proposed Regulations 10 (2004), http://www
.kff.org/medicare/upload/Marketing-and-Privacy-Issues-An-Analysis-of-the-
MMA-and-Proposed-Regulations.pdf.
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individuals for the purpose of selling their private plans. 149 In
many instances it is difficult for seniors to determine whether a
call is legitimate or fraudulent.150 Some commentators suggest
that beneficiaries must adapt to the changing Medicare pro-
gram by learning to "deal skeptically with people they have
generally trusted in the past" and interpret "complex informa-
tion about plans and providers." 151 Perhaps it is sensible for
beneficiaries to view themselves as consumers in the private
Medicare market. 152 However, Medicare patients are senior cit-
izens and chronically ill individuals who often have limited in-
comes,1 53 and therefore are more susceptible to promises re-
lated to medical care. It is unreasonable to require beneficiaries
to sort through convoluted Medicare information and determine
whether a plan's marketing materials are deceptive. Unfortu-
nately, state protections that inhibit insurers from unfairly tak-
ing advantage of beneficiaries are displaced by the weak federal
regulations.
Congress should not have preempted stronger state laws
with federal regulations that permit aggressive marketing. The
MMA's broad preemption facilitates abusive marketing practic-
es because it impedes other methods of law enforcement. 154 All
of the states already provide avenues for remedying the harm-
ful effects of predatory marketing. 155 Existing local infrastruc-
149. 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.80, 423.50 (2006) (detailing marketing regulations
but not prohibiting cold-calling).
150. E.g., Press Release, Better Business Bureau, Med Provision Asking
Personal Questions (Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.spokane.net/stay-
connected/PressReleases.aspx?prid=980 (describing deceptive cold-calls to se-
nior citizens).
151. Stan Jones, The Medicare Beneficiary as Consumer, in MEDICARE:
PREPARING FOR CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 37, at 61, 68.
152. Id. at 68-69.
153. See, e.g., Dawn E. Havrda et al., Impact of the Medicare Modernization
Act on Low-Income Persons, 143 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 600, 604 (2005)
(describing Medicare patient characteristics).
154. See 153 CONG. REC. S10,152 (daily ed. July 26, 2007) (statement of
Sen. Kohl) (noting that under current law, CMS has "exclusive authority to
investigate and discipline the marketing and selling of Medicare advantage
products" and states have "only been permitted to examine and enforce viola-
tions against individual insurance agents," which has "left a sizable enforce-
ment gap that has exacerbated the problems" of abusive marketing).
155. See, e.g., Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 15 (statement of Sean Dil-
weg, Insurance Comm'r, Wisconsin) (noting that under other circumstances
abusive marketing practices are either "prohibited by State laws or unfair or
deceptive practices in the business of insurance or would be questioned by
watchful State regulators and controlled by the State regulatory structure,"
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tures offer faster and more responsive remedies, although crit-
ics are likely to respond that forcing insurance companies to
comply with differing state regulations creates an unnecessary
burden.1 56
Uniform regulations may facilitate insurer compliance, but
this is not a reason to preempt state law. Admittedly, there are
difficulties in requiring plans to comply with fifty different
state insurance regulations. 157 Diverse regulations increase the
likelihood that insurers will be unaware of, and therefore not in
compliance with, each state's nuanced rules. 158 Such difficulties
have been cited as a reason to rely solely on preemptive federal
regulations. 159 However, this argument fails since insurers al-
ready abide by the laws of each state in which they sell their
other insurance products, including Medicare supplemental in-
surance (Medigap).160 Requiring plans to observe state law will
not create an unreasonable burden for the companies, as insur-
ers are already accustomed to adhering to state standards. 161
While uniform marketing standards have value, preemption
would be more justified if the federal government also imple-
mented sufficient protective regulations that were well en-
however, in cases involving Medicare Advantage and Medicare Part D, "our
hands are tied as it relates to the companies").
156. See, e.g., Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 87 (statement of Heidi
Margulis, Senior Vice President, Humana, Inc.) (advocating for uniform rules).
157. Hearing on the Regulation of Medicare Private Plans Before the Senior
Issues Task Force, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 5 (2007), http://www.naic.org/
committees b senior issuesmedicare-private.plans.htm [hereinafter NAIC
Hearing] (follow "BCBS of Minnesota" hyperlink) (written testimony of Lois
Wattman, Senior Policy Counsel, Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Minnesota) (ex-
plaining that approval by CMS and local officials is likely to create delays).
158. Id. at 4 (noting that increased state regulation would "make it impos-
sible" to meet the requirements of a product uniformly administered across the
entire region).
159. -Id. ("Blue Cross believes that the implications of increased oversight
and authority for state regulators in a Medicare multi-state regional plan
would make it extraordinarily difficult for the regional plan to meet its statu-
tory and regulatory requirements."); see also NAIC Hearing, supra note 157, at
3-4 (follow "BCBS of Michigan" hyperlink) (written testimony of Catherine
Schmitt, Vice President of Federal Programs, Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Mich-
igan) (arguing that "dual regulation" may lead to "conflicts and inconsistencies
in state oversight and Plan operations").
160. For an example of state regulations for marketing Medicare supple-
mental insurance, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1358.20 (West 2006).
161. See NAIC Hearing, supra note 157, at 5-6 (follow "California Health
Advocates" hyperlink) (written testimonies of Bonnie Burns, Training & Policy
Specialist, and David Lipschutz, Staff Attorney, California Health Advocates)
(describing state insurance regulation and analogizing past marketing abuse
of Medigap plans that led to state enforcement delegation).
1186 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1165
forced. However, as described below, the current enforcement
structure is not working.
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INADEQUATELY ENFORCES
MARKETING REGULATIONS
Ultimately, Medicare's private plans are government-
funded programs, therefore the government is responsible for
protecting beneficiaries. This Section argues that the federal
government's interest in promoting private Medicare plans ob-
structs its effectiveness as a law enforcer, which is evidenced by
CMS's reluctance to sanction abusive private plans.
1. The Federal Government's Conflicts of Interest Prevent
Effective Law Enforcement
Federal authorities are interested in preserving the Medi-
care program through private administration. 162 CMS has
acted more as a cheerleader for the private programs than an
enforcement agency, 163 and was slow to respond to initial re-
ports of marketing abuses. 164 Substantial federal payments to
private plans 165 make federal agencies a suspicious enforcer.
Perhaps indicative of CMS's investment in private plan
success, the agency only regulated insurance companies when
162. See Remarks Following a Meeting on Prescription Drug Benefits, 43
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 511 (Apr. 30, 2007) ("[W]hen you trust people to
make decisions in their lives, when you have competition, it is likely you'll get
lower price and better quality. It is the spirit of this reform that needs to be
now extended to Medicare overall.").
163. See, e.g., Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 3 (statement of Abby L.
Block, Director, Ctr. for Beneficiary Choices, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs.) (' Medicare Advantage is a valued, important option for millions of
people with Medicare."); Oversight & Investigations Hearing, supra note 13
(statement of Abby L. Block, Director, Ctr. for Beneficiary Choices, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs.) (emphasizing that the Medicare Advantage pro-
gram offers an "affordable, high value choice for all Medicare beneficiaries"
and that "enrollment is at an all-time high" with plans available in every state
and many rural areas).
164. CMS responded to reports of marketing abuses in early 2007 by noting
that such problems are "few" and "to be expected," further emphasizing that
"[w]ith any program of this size, you will always be able to find a few people
that are dissatisfied." See LIPSCHUTZ ET AL., supra note 88, at 2 (quoting CMS
spokesperson Aaron Hase).
165. See Oversight & Investigations Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of
Chairman Bart Stupak) ("Before MMA, the government was paying the pri-
vate plans 95% of the cost of traditional Medicare. Now, the government is
paying them 112% to 119% of traditional Medicare. 'Medicare Advantage' is
aptly named-it's richly funded to out-compete or privatize traditional Medi-
care.").
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faced with public pressure. In 2006, CMS released information
about plans' compliance status only after prompted by media
pressure. 166 In May 2007, CMS proposed new regulatory
changes to its oversight and enforcement of marketing guide-
lines, but the proposed revisions came after media reports of
misconduct and fraud problems.167 As pressure from advocates,
states, and Congress mounted in the last few months, CMS has
taken a series of steps to address the deceptive marketing of
Medicare Advantage "Private Fee-for-Service" (PFFS) plans. 168
An enforcement authority that only acts when faced with nega-
tive publicity is unsustainable and dangerous. CMS is not pre-
venting marketing abuse. Instead, CMS reacts only after pa-
tients have already been significantly harmed. As the sole
enforcer of private Medicare marketing, CMS's ad hoc and dis-
cretionary enforcement behavior jeopardizes patient health and
safety.
2. CMS Weakly Exercises Its Enforcement Authority
Of the compliance actions CMS reports taking, few are ac-
tually enforcement actions as defined in the regulations, such
as civil penalties or bans on marketing. 169 For example, in
166. TOBY S. EDELMAN, CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, INC., OVERSIGHT
AND ENFORCEMENT OF MEDICARE PART D PLAN REQUIREMENTS: FEDERAL
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 12 (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload
7558.pdf (noting that although CMS stated in its final regulations that it
would not publicly release ongoing information about plans' compliance status,
it released such information five days after the New York Times reported that
the federal government was having difficulties regulating federal marketing
standards).
167. See Medicare Program; Revisions to the Medicare Advantage and Part
D Prescription Drug Contract Determinations, Appeals, and Intermediate
Sanctions Processes, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,368 (May 25, 2007); LIPSCHUTZ ET AL.,
supra note 88, at 3.
168. Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS) plans are the
most lucrative private plans for insurers. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 244 (Mar.
2007), http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar07-ChO4.pdf. For examples of re-
cent actions taken to address PFFS plan marketing problems, see Insurers
Suspend the Marketing of Some Medicare Plans, supra note 84 (noting volun-
tary suspension), and Letter from Cynthia Tudor, Dir., Medicare Drug Benefit
Group, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to Medicare Advantage-
Prescription Drug Orgs., Cost-Based Plans, Stand-Alone Prescription Drug
Plans, Employer/Union-Sponsored Group Health Plans (May 14, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/
CallLetter.pdf (issuing updated expectations for private plans).
169. Compare 42 C.F.R. § 422.750 (2006) (describing kinds of sanctions),
with id. § 422.756 (detailing procedures for imposing sanctions).
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2006, CMS issued only "warning notices" to plans violating
marketing standards.170 Without compelling penalties, insurers
have no reason to change the abusive practices from which they
profit. Although CMS is authorized to conduct on-site audits to
determine plans' compliance,17 1 CMS employs an oversight
structure based on complaint processing, and will not conduct
focused or targeted audits unless "questionable findings" are
first identified in complaints. 172 Oversight by complaint track-
ing alone fails to capture the full scope of abusive marketing
and perversely places the burden on beneficiaries to navigate
their way through complex bureaucratic grievance proce-
dures.173 In many instances, these complaints are first filtered
through the plans themselves. 174
CMS relies too much on plan self-regulation. 175 The agency
gives private plan sponsors considerable authority to monitor
and correct their own behavior,176 indicating that CMS will lim-
it its civil enforcement activities only to "large, repeat and/or
egregious" violations. 177 Depending on plans to self-police
themselves is a dangerous strategy on its face and does not
work in practice. The Department of Health and Human Ser-
170. CMS reported issuing "warning letters" and "notices of non-
compliance," which are merely written notices required by the regulations be-
fore an enforcement action can occur. Compare Press Release, Ctrs. for Medi-
care & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Details Steps Taken to Improve Customer
Service by Drug Plans: Data Shows Improvements in Plan Call Center Wait
Times (June 29, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/
release.asp?Counter=1890 (reporting the issuance of written notices), with 42
C.F.R. § 422.750 (detailing the types of applicable sanctions), and id. § 422.756
(detailing procedures for imposing sanctions).
171. 42 C.F.R. § 423.505(e)(ii).
172. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PART D OVERSIGHT STRAT-
EGY FOR CONTRACTORS/INDUSTRY 3 (2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/OversightStrategyl0.24.05.pdf.
173. Cf. Pear, supra note 6 (reporting that the extent of marketing prob-
lems "almost surely exceeds" official data because many victims never file
complaints).
174. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 172, at 6 (noting
that CMS will receive data from plans and then "will develop reports and re-
lated intervention metrics to serve as the triggers to ad hoc data mining and
reporting").
175. See id. at 2 (explaining that contractor management activity is based
on analysis of self-reported, unaudited plan data from Part D contractors).
176. See Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 Fed.
Reg. 4194, 4334 (Jan. 28, 2005) (codified in 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 403, 411, 417,
and 423) (eliminating a mandatory requirement that plan sponsors report "vi-
olations of law, regulation, or other wrongdoing on the part of the organization
or its employees/officers").
177. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 172, at 2.
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vices' Office of the Inspector General discovered that many pri-
vate plan sponsors failed to develop policies to ensure internal
compliance with CMS regulations, including those governing
marketing. 178 While some private plan providers voluntarily
agreed to suspend marketing after reported abuses, 179 the
structure remains ripe for abuse as long as private companies
are allowed to determine their own violations and penalties.
Representative Pete Stark noted that permitting the companies
to determine "which crimes they'll plead to and which sen-
tences they'll serve" does "virtually nothing to protect Medicare
beneficiaries" and the voluntary marketing suspension is only
"a pathetic attempt to preempt congressional action."'8 0 Al-
though other members of Congress have also acknowledged
some of the flaws in the current regulatory structure,' 8 ' pro-
posed legislative solutions to the marketing abuse crisis do not
include enough protections for Medicare patients.
C. PENDING LEGISLATION LACKS COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS
TO PROTECT BENEFICIARIES
In response to the growing problem of abusive marketing,
congressional leaders have proposed legislation to address pre-
datory Medicare marketing. Senator Herb Kohl remarked that
it is "clear that a major disconnect in oversight exists" and that
it is "simply unacceptable to leave our seniors unprotected."'' 8 2
178. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., No. OEI-01-05-00130, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE MARKETING MATERIALS
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2005, at 12 (2006), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
oei/reports/oei-01-05-00130.pdf (concluding, after audits of Medicare Advan-
tage plans in fiscal year 2005, that marketing materials lacked CMS-required
information essential for beneficiaries to make informed plan choices and
plans used unclear and technical language in their marketing materials).
179. See, e.g., Insurers Suspend the Marketing of Some Medicare Plans, su-
pra note 84; see also Kendra Casey Plank, Internal Auditors Should Be Key
Part of Compliance for Medicare Rx Plans, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP., Jan.
2008, at 1, 16 (2008), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ipfbna/HFR.NSF/eh
a0b5n2z7w5 (stating that insurers are advocating for internal compliance au-
dits).
180. John Reichard, CMS: Seven Private Fee-for-Service Plans to Suspend
Marketing, CONG. Q. HEALTHBEAT NEWS, June 15, 2007, http://public.cq.com/
docs/hb/hbnewsl10-000002533208.html (quoting California Representative
Pete Stark).
181. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Rep. Bart Stupak, Stupak Leads Investiga-
tion into "Medicare Advantage" Marketing Abuses (June 26, 2007), available
at http://www.house.gov/list/speechmiOl-stupak/MedicareAdvantage062607
.html.
182. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Special Comm. on Aging, Kohl Bill Gives
State More Power to Regulate Sales and Marketing of Medicare Advantage
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On July 26, 2007, Senator Kohl introduced the Accountability
and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of 2007.183 This
bill calls for standardized marketing of prescription drug and
Medicare Advantage plans and specifically prohibits cross-
selling of non-Medicare products, telemarketing, and offering
rebates to induce enrollment.184 While certain prohibited activi-
ties are enumerated in the bill, the legislation also calls for the
NAIC to develop standardized marketing requirements. 185
The House has taken similar steps. A House bill inserted a
provision into the "Children's Health and Medicare Protection
Act of 2007," which delegated authority to the NAIC to develop
marketing standards.1 86 However, the version that eventually
passed in the House and Senate lacked any provisions related
to Medicare marketing.187 Another House bill was introduced to
provide "broader and more informed protection" to Medicare-
eligible individuals from abusive marketing practices of Medi-
care prescription drug plans. 88 However, this proposal only
applies to the sales of prescription drug plans offered under
Part D or drug plans that are part of a Medicare Advantage
product-it does not even attempt to regulate marketing of
most Medicare Advantage plans. 189 The bill also fails to dele-
gate any authority to states,-9 0 and therefore does not acknowl-
edge federal enforcement problems.
While this legislative activity is a significant step in rein-
ing in the problem of abusive marketing, the proposed bills fall
short in developing comprehensive solutions. Senator Kohl's
Plans (July 26, 2007), available at http://aging.senate.govlrecord.cfm?id=
279942.
183. S. 1883, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). A bill with the same provisions was
also introduced in the House on December 18, 2007. See H.R. 4790, 110th
Cong. § 1 (2007).
184. S. 1883, § 2.
185. See id. § 2(c)(1), (4).
186. H.R. 3162, 110th Cong. § 411 (2007) (providing for the NAIC's devel-
opment of marketing, advertising, and other protections related to private
Medicare plans).
187. See Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of
2007, H.R. 976, 110th Cong. (as passed by House and Senate, Sept. 27, 2007).
President Bush vetoed the Act on Oct. 3, 2007. Bush Vetoes Child Health In-
surance Plan, MSNBC.CoM, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
21111931.
188. See Preventing Medicare Seniors from Being Confused Due to Abusive
Marketing (Prevent Medicare SCAMs) Act of 2007, H.R. 2307, 110th Cong. § 1
(2007).
189. See id. §§ 2-4.
190. See id.
1190 [92:1165
MODERNIZING MEDICARE
proposal is the best of the pending bills because it attempts the
broadest solution. The proposal should be commended for
granting states the authority to enforce marketing require-
ments,191 prohibiting cold-calling, and eliminating cross-
selling.192 However, new uniform regulations from the NAIC
may be inadequate and inadvertently supplant more protective
existing state laws that could be used immediately. 193 The ben-
efits of standardized regulations are acknowledged and dis-
cussed above, but the development of uniform marketing re-
quirements as proposed in this bill may be unnecessarily time-
consuming,194 given that state laws are readily applicable.
In addition to waiting for the NAIC to develop new and po-
tentially inadequate regulations, Senator Kohl's bill leaves be-
neficiaries powerless. The lack of a private right of action' 95
means that beneficiaries would continue to depend on govern-
ment enforcers to take up their cause, or risk judicial dismis-
sal. 196 As demonstrated by other model rules it developed, the
NAIC appears unlikely to support private enforcement
rights. 97 The government should ensure that beneficiaries are
protected from abusive marketing to the greatest extent possi-
ble, including provision for direct access to judicial remedies.
Congressional attention to abusive Medicare marketing is
an important step towards controlling predatory marketing
problems, but the current proposals are not strong enough. It is
important to improve the substance of the federal regulations
and allow states to enforce the regulations, as Senator Kohl's
191. See S. 1883, 110th Cong. § 2(c)(2)(B) (2007) (letting states enforce fed-
eral marketing rules).
192. Id. § 2(c)(1)(B).
193. See id. § 2(c)(1)-(2) (providing that only uniform federal standards will
be used to regulate plans).
194. For example, if the NAIC does not submit a report articulating stan-
dardized marketing requirements, the duty falls to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to promulgate such regulations. Id. § 2(c)(2). Even if the
NAIC does develop regulations, they must still be considered and approved by
the Secretary. Id.
195. The bill does not provide beneficiaries with a private cause of action.
See S. 1883.
196. See Dial v. Healthspring of Ala., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Ala.
2007) (dismissing private action as a violation of the MMA); Uhm v. Humana,
Inc., No. C06-0185-RSM, 2006 WL 1587443, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June 2, 2006)
(preventing individuals' suit under state law).
197. See Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Suitability in Annuity Transactions
Model Regulation, NAIC 275-1 § 1(b) (West 2007) ("Nothing herein shall be
construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this
regulation.").
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bill provides. However, even the Kohl solution is ineffective
since stronger state laws are preempted by uniform federal
standards that may offer only minimal protections. Additional-
ly, the pending bills continue to deny beneficiaries access to
judicial redress. In the interests of preventing future abuse and
promoting justice for those already harmed, it is critical to de-
velop a better and more prompt solution.
III. RECONSIDERING THE PRIVATE MEDICARE
REGULATION STRUCTURE
Ultimately, beneficiaries do not have the luxury of evaluat-
ing complex federal regulations, nor do they have the occasion
to reflect on the proper balance of state and federal enforce-
ment authority. Rather, Medicare beneficiaries face declining
health and rapidly rising care costs that require immediate
access to affordable medical treatment. To continue supporting
the medical needs of America's most vulnerable patients, Con-
gress should craft a legislative solution that protects beneficia-
ries from predatory marketing. First, Congress should draw
from consumer protection models to substantively improve
marketing regulations without preempting stronger state laws.
Second, to remedy enforcement problems, Congress should re-
peal the preemption clauses in current Medicare law, and ex-
pressly delegate enforcement authority to states. Third, Con-
gress should promote individual rights by providing
beneficiaries with an explicit private cause of action. Finally,
Congress should advance Medicare's policy goals through viola-
tion penalties.
A. MEDICARE MARKETING REGULATIONS SHOULD BE
STRENGTHENED TO PREVENT ABUSE
Medicare beneficiaries deserve broad statutory protections.
Medicare recipients are victimized by deceptive marketing tac-
tics ranging from omitted benefit information1 98 to aggressive
sales tactics 99 to outright fraud.200 Accordingly, a legislative
198. E.g., Armen Keteyian, Medicare Disadvantage: Privatized Health Care
for Seniors Can Leave Them in the Dark as Insurance Companies Reap a
Windfall, CBSNEWS.COM, July 16, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/
07/16/cbsnewsinvestigates/main3062725.shtml#ccmm (describing the story of
an individual who did not understand his Medicare Advantage plan coverage
until after he broke his leg and experienced claim denials).
199. E.g., Pear, supra note 6 (noting how an insurance agent forced his way
into a beneficiary's apartment and enrolled her in a private Medicare plan).
200. E.g., Elizabeth Williamson & Christopher Lee, Abuses in Enrollment
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solution is required that would encompass the assortment of
unfair marketing tactics employed by private insurers. As ab-
usive marketing spreads, beneficiaries are less likely to trust,
and therefore enroll, in private plans. To preserve the private
plan options, the government and insurers administering Med-
icare plans should support legislation to prevent and remedy
marketing abuse.
This Part argues that consumer protection laws represent
ideal and workable solutions for abusive marketing problems.
Detailing useful consumer protection theories, this Part ana-
lyzes how these theories may be employed to protect beneficia-
ries while preserving Medicare's private programs. This Section
concludes by arguing that even if Congress improves federal
marketing regulations, stronger state laws should not be
preempted.
1. Consumer Protection Laws Are Model Legislative Solutions
Consumer protection laws are a statutory response to the
inadequacy of the common law in protecting buyers from unfair
and deceptive acts in the marketplace. 20 1 Accordingly, many
consumer protection statutes developed creative and effective
solutions to regulate marketplace conduct. 20 2 State and federal
"unfair and deceptive acts and practices" (UDAP) statutes serve
as models for a solution to Medicare marketing abuse.20 3
UDAP statutes are characterized by broad language 20 4 in-
tended to be construed in favor of consumers. 2 05 Courts interp-
Tactics Found for Private Medicare, WASH. POST, May 16, 2007, at A3 (report-
ing on insurance agents' use of personal information stolen from federal
records to enroll individuals in private plans).
201. Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private
Enforcement of Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 163, 166 (2006).
202. See id.
203. The primary federal statute broadly protecting consumers from fraud
is the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), which declares unlawful any
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." See Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). Every state has adopted a simi-
lar statutory fraud law prohibiting "unfair and deceptive marketplace con-
duct." Cox, supra note 201, at 166.
204. For example, a Minnesota UDAP statute lists thirteen acts that are
prohibited when made by a person "in the course of business, vocation, or op-
eration," including any conduct that "creates a likelihood of confusion or mi-
sunderstanding." MINN. STAT. § 325D.44, subdiv. 1(13) (2006).
205. Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962,
967 (D. Minn. 2001) (interpreting the Minnesota UDAP statute and noting
that the law is "broader than common law fraud"); see also Ly v. Nystrom, 615
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ret UDAP language to apply to a range of different practices
and actors. 206 Commentators note that UDAP provisions allow
consumers and government enforcers to establish deception
through a much less rigorous showing than is required under
the common law.207 Many of these statutes authorize civil pe-
nalties 20 8 and provide a private right of action. 209 While the lib-
eral UDAP standards have been criticized, 210 the nationwide
implementation of the consumer fraud protections has notably
prevented abusive behavior. 211
The UDAP model is an ideal framework to consider when
crafting a remedy for Medicare's abusive marketing problems.
Private Medicare plans have the potential to offer more inclu-
sive health benefit options for enrollees. 212 However, preserving
the value of consumer health care choices depends on beneficia-
N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that Minnesota's consumer
fraud law "reflects a clear legislative policy encouraging aggressive prosecu-
tion of statutory violations" and thus should be 'liberally construed in favor of
protecting consumers").
206. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240-44
(1972) (discussing the broad scope of the FTCA); Lemelledo v. Beneficial
Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 551-52 (N.J. 1997) (holding that although
the New Jersey consumer fraud act does not explicitly include insurance, the
broad language extends to insurance-sales practices).
207. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (noting that consum-
er fraud laws often do not require the traditional elements of common law
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, such as reliance, intent, injury,
and damages); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practic-
es Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 444
(1991).
208. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
209. See Cox, supra note 201, at 167 (stating that although the FTCA has
no private right of action, all states, except Iowa, have a private cause of ac-
tion for violations of state statutory fraud laws).
210. See, e.g., Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 207, at 37-42 (noting that
consumer protection statutes are increasingly used to assert novel, private
causes of action against perceived deep-pocket companies and unpopular in-
dustries where liability would not ordinarily exist under common law).
211. See Sovern, supra note 207, at 445 (stating that UDAP standards have
"vastly aided" the FTC in preventing abusive behavior).
212. Posting of NelmsOl to CBS News, Medicare Disadvantage, http://www
.cbsnews.comlstories/2007/07/16/cbsnewsinvestigates/main3062725.shtml#
ccmm (July 17, 2007, 17:13 EST) ("I have found Medicare Advantage plans to
be well designed and much more advantageous, for the price, for the plan
members. Mine have included membership in the senior exercise program Sil-
ver Sneakers, which promotes a healthy lifestyle and which my wife and I
have found to be wonderful.").
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ries' ability to access accurate coverage information. 213 Broad
UDAP language allows legal action against a wide scope of
marketing abuses, but also promotes truthful advertising that
encourages beneficiaries to select plans offering appropriate
coverage for their care needs.
2. Consumer Protections Encourage Beneficiary Enrollment
Deterring deceptive marketing improves the efficiency of
the market. 214 Ideally, the more accurate information consum-
ers possess when they choose among competing purchases, the
more efficiently the market will function. 215 An underlying
theory of UDAP laws is that preventing deceptive sales tactics
protects the interests of the economy as a whole when consum-
ers are disappointed, or worse, when products fail to live up to
their advertisements. 216 If beneficiaries believe insurance
agents, and rely on accurate marketing materials when making
plan selections, insurers' advertising efforts are valuable. 217
However, if unfair marketing practices continue, beneficiaries
may ignore insurers' marketing efforts or avoid private plan op-
tions entirely. 21 8 Therefore, insurers have an interest in abiding
by high ethical standards when marketing their plans.21 9 How-
213. See ELEANOR DEARMAN KINNEY, PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE CONSUMERS 105-06 (2002) (noting that coverage information defining
the amount, duration, and scope of services underwritten by an insurance plan
is "most important" for accessing health care services).
214. See Sovern, supra note 207, at 453.
215. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. It is a
matter of public interest that [economic] decisions . . . be intelligent and well
informed....").
216. Sovern, supra note 207, at 453 (stating that inaccurate advertising
distorts the market).
217. Cf. Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Reg-
ulation of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REV. 661, 663 (1977) ("Advertising substi-
tutes for search costs by consumers by providing in a convenient and usable
form information necessary for consumers to make choices among available
brands, and in the process facilitates the functioning of a market economy.").
218. Cf. Sovern, supra note 207, at 453 (explaining that if consumers do not
believe marketing materials, and consequently ignore advertising when decid-
ing which goods and services to purchase, advertising will lose much of its
value).
219. At least one plan has supported strengthening marketing regulations.
See NAIC Hearing, supra note 157, at 2 (follow "BCBS of Michigan" hyperlink)
(written Testimony of Catherine Schmitt, Vice President of Federal Programs,
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Michigan) ('Ve support implementation and en-
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ever, even if federal regulations are strengthened to prevent
abuse and promote legitimate sales of private plans, they
should not displace state laws.
3. Stronger State Laws Should Not Be Preempted
More agile than the federal government, states are better
positioned to react quickly to local problems. 220 Medicare mar-
keting abuse is best addressed through dual enforcement. Fed-
eral Medicare marketing standards should set a floor of basic
protections without preempting more forceful state laws. There
are a number of federal consumer protection laws that save
stronger state laws from preemption. 22 1 The Medicare law
should similarly provide for the use of existing state law.
State consumer protection laws are immediately available
to fill the substantive gaps in federal Medicare marketing regu-
lations.222 All states have enacted such laws. 223 Some laws spe-
cifically prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the insur-
ance industry.224 Unfortunately, courts have held that the
MMA preempts state consumer protections. 22 5 Congress should
therefore repeal the MMA's preemption clause and allow bene-
ficiaries to access judicial remedies under state laws. In addi-
forcement of CMS marketing guidelines and efforts to strengthen enforcement
of these requirements.").
220. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.").
221. E.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000); Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000); Employee Poly-
graph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000).
222. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1 to -15 (2002 & Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.50.471 to 45.50.561 (2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2007); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10-1-370 to -375 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401 to 51:1420
(2003 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1211-1216 (2002 & Supp.
2007-2008). For a state-by-state list of unfair and deceptive trade practices
statutes, see Mark E. Swirbalus, New Rubric of Risk: Unfair Trade Practices,
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., July 19-20, 2007.
223. Sovern, supra note 207, at 446 (noting that in the 1950s, states began
to enact statutes designed to prohibit deceptive and unfair practices and that
by 1981, every state in the country had enacted such a statute).
224. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-815 (2006); 18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 2303 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:13-102 (2005).
225. See Dial v. HealthSpring of Ala., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1350,
(S.D. Ala. 2007) (preempting state consumer protection claims); Uhm v. Hu-
mana, Inc., No. C06-0185-RSM, 2006 WL 1587443, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 2,
2006) (same).
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tion to offering greater substantive protection for beneficiaries,
states have also developed effective enforcement mechanisms
that could quickly remedy marketing abuses.
B. STATES ARE APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES TO
RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
CMS's failure to enforce marketing regulations may be re-
medied by delegating enforcement authority to states. This Sec-
tion argues that in addition to enforcing their own laws, states
should enforce federal marketing regulations because local au-
thorities are more accountable to their citizens.
1. States Should Enforce Federal Marketing Regulations
A number of federal consumer protection statutes delegate
authority to states to sue for violations of federal consumer pro-
tection laws. 226 Often these laws provide specific remedies that
may differ from those authorized for the federal agency. 227 Most
federal statutes authorizing enforcement by states also contain
provisions noting that the federal grant of authority does not
limit state investigatory powers.2 28
States have shown that they possess the necessary inde-
pendence and infrastructure to effectively regulate private
Medicare plans.229 States already regulate Medicare-related in-
surance products, such as Medigap. 230 The Medigap regulatory
framework balances state and federal regulation. 23 1 Federal
legislation requires state approval of Medigap insurers under a
226. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c) (2000);
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6103 (2000).
227. For example, state remedies may include statutory injunctive relief,
damages on behalf of citizens, restitution, civil penalties, and attorneys' fees
and costs. See Prentiss Cox & Tom James, Government Enforcement Actions
and Regulatory Oversight, in 2 10TH ANN. CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LITIGA-
TION INSTITUTE 491, 499 (2005).
228. See id.
229. See, e.g., Humana Pays $500,000 Fine in Oklahoma for Unlicensed
Sales, INS. J., Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/southcentral/2007/08/24/82982.htm.
230. Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 23 (statement of Sean Dilweg, Insur-
ance Comm'r, Wisconsin) ("From the Medicare beneficiary standpoint, Medi-
gap is a proven successful example of shared state-federal regulation of a Med-
icare-related product that works well, and is popular with Medicare
beneficiaries.").
231. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2000 & Supp. V 2007) (providing for state and fed-
eral certification of Medigap policies).
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regulatory program that meets or exceeds the federal minimum
standards.232 This framework mirrors Senator Kohl's propos-
al,233 since the NAIC developed Medigap's uniform stan-
dards.234 However, unlike Senator Kohl's bill, 235 the uniform
federal standards for Medigap are a floor-allowing states to
set the ceiling. 236 States have enacted rigorous requirements for
insurers, including marketing regulations. 237 This existing reg-
ulatory structure allows states to enforce marketing require-
ments against both agents and companies. 238 The existing in-
frastructure and state regulatory system should be used to
control private Medicare plans. Doing so would facilitate spee-
dy remedies for beneficiaries and prevent the escalation of ab-
usive marketing since states are not distracted by conflicted in-
terests in promoting private Medicare programs.
2. States Provide Greater Accountability to Citizens
State regulation will offer greater accountability to victi-
mized citizens. Unlike the presidential appointees charged with
administering CMS,239 state law enforcement officials are more
232. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 403.200-.258 (2006).
233. Accountability and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of 2007,
S. 1883, 110th Cong. (2007).
234. Mary Elizabeth Derwin & Diane C. Lehman, Medicare and Private
Supplemental Insurance, in 1 ELDERLAW: ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 10:133
(Joan M. Krauskopf et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (summarizing the regulatory
structure for Medigap insurance).
235. The bill permits states to impose sanctions against insurance compa-
nies and agents selling private Medicare plans only for violations of federal
standardized marketing requirements. See S. 1883 § 2(c)(2)(B); 153 CONG.
REC. S10,153 (daily ed. July 26, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (noting that
uniform marketing standards will be adopted and enforced by individual
states).
236. The NAIC Model Regulations for Medigap insurance clarify that
stronger state laws are not preempted. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
NAIC MEDICARE SUPPLEMENT INSURANCE MODEL REGULATIONS COMPLIANCE
MANUAL 4 (1999) (noting that states must "provide for the application and en-
forcement of Medicare supplement standards that are at least as stringent as
the NAIC Model standards").
237. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1358.20 (West 2006); MINN.
STAT. § 62A.39 (2006).
238. Aging Hearing, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Sean Dilweg, Insur-
ance Comm'r, Wisconsin) ("One of the significant benefits of using Medigap as
a model regulatory approach for the MMA products is that states will be again
able to regulate both the agents and the companies in the marketing and sales
of these products.").
239. 42 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (Supp. V 2007) ("The Administrator of the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services shall be appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.").
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responsive to local citizens. Often state attorneys general or in-
surance commissioners are elected positions. 240 Therefore, if
beneficiaries are frustrated with inadequate law enforcement,
they can respond democratically. Even if not elected, state gov-
ernment agencies may be more receptive to citizens because
their duties are limited in scope and not polluted by a conflicted
interest in supporting Medicare's private plans; unlike the fed-
eral government, states do not pay insurers to remain in the
Medicare program. Additionally, states will not levy discipli-
nary actions under the shroud of federal bureaucracy.24 1
Although state enforcement may be more responsive than
federal agencies, there is still a risk that state governments
will be unable or unwilling to forcefully pursue claims of mar-
keting abuse. Therefore, it is important to ensure that benefi-
ciaries have access to a judicial forum.
C. EMPOWERING MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES THROUGH A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
As public benefits are increasingly privatized, the govern-
ment must ensure that beneficiaries' individual rights are pro-
tected. 242 Beneficiaries are currently hindered by the MMA's
preemption clause, 243 and depend on ineffective government en-
forcers for redress. Congress should therefore remove the statu-
240. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 11 (providing for the election of the at-
torney general); CONN. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (same); DEL. CONST. art. 3, § 21
(providing for the election of the insurance commissioner); OKLA. CONST. art.
6, § 23 (same).
241. When advocates file complaints with Medicare about plan conduct, the
results of these complaints, if any, are rarely made available. NAIC Hearing,
supra note 157, at 4 (follow "California Health Advocates" hyperlink) (written
testimonies of Bonnie Burns, Training & Policy Specialist, and David Lip-
schutz, Staff Attorney, California Health Advocates). But, states may be eager
to showcase their law enforcement achievements. See Press Release, Okla. Ins.
Dep't, Commissioner Holland Fines Humana $500,000 for Unlicensed Insur-
ance Sales to Oklahoma Seniors (Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://www.oid
.state.ok.us/www2.oid.state.ok.us/News/News%20Releases/2007/Humana%
20Consent%200rder%20082207.pdf.
242. Beneficiaries are frequently not given proper notice of their appeal
rights under Part D. See VICKI GOTTLICH, BENEFICIARY CHALLENGES IN US-
ING THE MEDICARE PART D APPEALS PROCESS TO OBTAIN MEDICALLY NECES-
SARY DRUGS 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/
7557.pdf.
243. See, e.g., Dial v. HealthSpring of Ala., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1359
(D. Ala. 2007) (holding that private causes of action based on insurer miscon-
duct in soliciting private Medicare plan enrollment fall within areas that Con-
gress intended to regulate through the MMA, and thus are preempted by fed-
eral law).
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tory impediments and expressly include a private right of ac-
tion. Other federal consumer protection statutes include pri-
vate enforcement provisions, 244 and most state consumer pro-
tection laws provide for a private right of action. 245 However,
none of the pending legislative solutions to the Medicare mar-
keting crisis allow beneficiaries to independently sue. 246 This
Section argues that private enforcement options are more flexi-
ble and effective for remedying power disparities between bene-
ficiaries and insurers.
1. Private Enforcement Is More Flexible
Unlike government agencies, private plaintiffs are not li-
mited by the public policy implications of their lawsuits and are
not forced to make judgments about how to expend limited re-
sources.247 Government agencies often lack sufficient resources
to pursue every consumer fraud claim vigorously and face
strong incentives to confine their enforcement activities to cas-
es that have a broad impact. 248 While public agencies may exer-
cise their discretion improperly, in the consumer arena they
usually err on the side of doing too little, rather than too
much.249 Even though public enforcement may reduce wasteful
litigation, 250 it may also neglect valid claims. 251 The same prin-
ciples apply to private Medicare plans.
Even if state and federal government agencies combine en-
forcement efforts, they will likely overlook some individuals'
244. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000); Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2000); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681(n)-(p) (2000).
245. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 8.31 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2007).
246. See Preventing Medicare Seniors from Being Confused Due to Abusive
Marketing (Prevent Medicare SCAMs) Act of 2007, H.R. 2307, 110th Cong. § 1
(2007); Accountability and Transparency in Medicare Marketing Act of 2007,
S. 1883, 110th Cong. (2007).
247. See Philip G. Schrag, In Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the
Consumer in New York City, 80 YALE L.J. 1529, 1529-30 (1971) (explaining
that inadequate funding, understaffing, and the absence of a common mission
"conspired to render government agencies ineffective or, in some cases, ser-
vants of industry, while consumer fraud flourished").
248. Id.
249. Sovern, supra note 207, at 452.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., Beslity v. Manhattan Honda, 467 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474 (App.
Div. 1983) (noting that New York's private claim statute was enacted because
of the "inability of the New York State Attorney-General to adequately police
false advertising and deceptive trade practices").
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claims due to the sheer volume of complaints. 252 Victims of ab-
usive marketing frequently receive "drastically reduced" cover-
age for medical treatment. 253 It is therefore necessary to ensure
prompt resolution in order to prevent physical injury and de-
trimental economic damages. 254 Individual enforcement action
is the most effective means of redressing personal harm: bene-
ficiaries would not have to depend on the benevolence of gov-
ernment enforcers, but could seek immediate relief through the
courts. Unlike public enforcement measures, private suits pro-
vide tailored remedies in proportion to the amount of harm suf-
fered. For example, a beneficiary may not have suffered a large
amount of damages to justify government intervention, but
even a small amount of economic damage is likely to dispropor-
tionately impact the individual beneficiary. The beneficiary
therefore deserves to bring suit in a forum that will conscien-
tiously review the individual circumstances of the case.
2. Congress Should Address Power Disparities Between Plans
and Patients
Beneficiaries should have adequate status and power in
any dispute resolution process with insurers to assure that
their concerns are fairly adjudicated. 255 Health care consumers
often have difficulty conceptualizing their concerns in a way
that will command a remedy, and this disadvantage is en-
hanced when patients are poor and sick.256 Commentators have
noted that the imbalance of power between patients and their
health plans is exacerbated by the inadequacy of current legal
doctrines that limit due process protections and restrict access
to the judicial system under broad preemption provisions. 257
Private enforcement would be an important step towards re-
medying the problem of beneficiaries' lesser bargaining pow-
er.2 58
252. Enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans has increased sharply, from
4.7 million in 2003 to more than 8 million in 2007. Pear, supra note 10.
253. See, e.g., Harris v. Pacificare Life & Health Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 2d
1280, 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (noting that the plaintiffs contended that their
medical coverage was "drastically reduced" under the defendant's private Med-
icare Advantage plan and resulted in denied treatment, which caused "physi-
cal injury and mental distress" as well as "large medical bills").
254. See id.
255. KINNEY, supra note 213, at 162.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 163.
258. Cf. Cox, supra note 201, at 172 (explaining that a "progressive" con-
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Congress should equalize the power differential by provid-
ing incentives for beneficiaries to sue. In an effort to make it
worth the individual's while to pursue merchants who engage
in deceptive practices, many state consumer laws award treble
damages, 259 punitive damages, 260 or statutory damages. 261
Nearly all state private consumer enforcement statutes author-
ize the award of attorney's fees to successful consumer plain-
tiffs. 262 In the Medicare context, insurers will no doubt have
concerns about large economic awards and are likely to lobby
against damage provisions. The purpose of private enforcement
should be to prevent marketing abuse and remedy harm, with-
out jeopardizing the sustainability of the benefits. Accordingly,
Congress should authorize courts to award attorney's fees to
encourage enforcement, but perhaps cap damage awards to ap-
pease insurers and avoid frivolous suits. The possibility of
damage recovery or attorney's fees would likely deter compa-
nies from engaging in deceptive practices. 263 Even so, Congress
should also consider elevating administrative penalties.
D. MOTIVATING COMPLIANCE THROUGH RIGOROUS PENALTIES
Congress has great latitude to delineate critical policies
pertaining to Medicare's commercial health plans through the
contracting process. 264 Congress should leverage this power to
enhance the effectiveness of violation penalties. This Section
proposes dual state and federal issuance of intermediate sanc-
tions while reserving plan exclusion sanctions as a sole federal
power. This Section concludes by arguing that all sanctions for
sumer protection enforcement means "lawsuits that have the effect of rectify-
ing an imbalance of power between consumers and the sellers who typically
control the terms of marketplace transactions").
259. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2007) (awarding treble damages);
see also Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 404 (N.C. 1981) (stating that
treble damages make it "more economically feasible" for private individuals to
bring an action).
260. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.025(1) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-
5.2 (2007).
261. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10 (1975) (limiting damages to $100);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.911 (2007) (capping damages at $250).
262. Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or
Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130 (1987) (noting that all states
that have private rights of action also have provisions for attorneys' fees,
which are intended to encourage private enforcement of the consumer protec-
tion laws on the theory that a free market is in the public interest).
263. See Sovern, supra note 207, at 449.
264. KINNEY, supra note 213, at 57.
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marketing abuse should advance the core social policies of the
Medicare program.
Under current regulations, CMS may impose intermediate
sanctions and civil money penalties on insurers.265 The agency
may also order plans to suspend the enrollment of Medicare
beneficiaries, halt payments to the insurer, and require sus-
pension of all marketing activities. 266 The sanctions may con-
tinue until CMS is satisfied that the deficiency is corrected and
will not recur. 267 These are important tools to incorporate into a
shared federal-state enforcement scheme. Since CMS is reluc-
tant to regulate plans, states should be empowered to leverage
these sanctions. But the most powerful penalty, plan exclusion,
should be reserved for CMS.
CMS may presently terminate contracts with insurers that
violate marketing standards. 268 Unlike the Medicare+Choice
program that struggled to retain private insurers, the MMA
programs experienced higher than expected plan participa-
tion.269 Economic incentives are likely a reason for this high
participation. 270 The lucrative compensation insurers earn
through their participation also makes the threat of exclusion
particularly powerful. Although states should coordinate their
enforcement efforts with CMS and recommend exclusion of par-
ticularly egregious plans, CMS should be the only enforcer that
expels abusive plans. Keeping the exclusion sanction centra-
lized is important since it has a nationwide impact. The over-
riding goal of all penalties should be the promotion of Medi-
care's social policies.
Marketing abuse remedies should promote and protect ac-
cessible health care. 271 Medicare was created to provide medical
265. 42 C.F.R. § 422.750 (2006).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. § 422.510 (permitting CMS to terminate a contract with a Medi-
care Advantage sponsor for substantially failing to comply with the marketing
requirements).
269. Oberlander, supra note 65, at 189.
270. E.g., Gold, supra note 72, at 1303-04 (stating that higher payments
created an influx of participating plans).
271. Cf. ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW 43-44 (2006)
(emphasizing the role legislative policy should play in litigating cases under
the National Labor Relations Act, in that "the evidence must do more than
demonstrate that certain acts have taken place; it must show how those ac-
tions violate the Act's language and purposes and why a particular remedy is
appropriate in promoting those purposes").
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coverage for aged and disabled Americans. 272 The program has
a strong history of making medical care accessible and valuing
patient choice. 273 Insurer conduct that restrains patients'
treatment options and degrades beneficiaries' ability to make
informed choices violates the essential goals of the Medicare
program,274 and should be publicly sanctioned. Advancing Med-
icare's policy goals requires not only remedying individual inju-
ries as described above, but also preventing marketing abuse
through rigorous sanctions by state and federal authorities.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of this solution is best evaluated from the
perspective of victimized beneficiaries. Therefore, it is worth
considering how such a solution could have assisted T.W. Al-
dridge. Mr. Aldridge spent his last days plodding through a
federal bureaucratic maze and died worrying that his medical
debt would burden his family. 275 If Congress amended the Med-
icare law with the solution presented in this Note, Mr. Al-
dridge's struggle may have ended differently. Once Mr. Al-
dridge realized that he was fraudulently enrolled in a Medicare
Advantage plan, he could have filed complaints with federal
and state law enforcers. Upon learning of the incident, the in-
surance company would have likely immediately canceled Mr.
Aldridge's enrollment, as he requested, or else risk government
and judicial sanctions. If Mr. Aldridge did not obtain the relief
that he requested from government enforcers, he could have
independently brought suit alleging unfair and deceptive trade
practices. Any one of these actions could have reinstated Mr.
Aldridge's medical coverage and reimbursed his economic loss.
This proposed solution provides multiple remedial avenues for
patients like Mr. Aldridge, rather than the single and seriously
inadequate remedy available under the current law. Providing
full access to state judicial and law enforcement options would
not have forced Mr. Aldridge to take on the private insurance
company alone.
272. The title of the Medicare Act is "Health Insurance for Aged and Dis-
abled." 42 U.S.C. § 1394 (2000 & Supp. IV 2005).
273. See id. § 1395a (guaranteeing patients' free choices).
274. See id. § 1395b-2 (requiring a "clear, simple explanation" of benefits).
275. Keteyian, supra note 1 (quoting Mr. Aldridge's last words to his son,
"take care of your mom, make sure you take care of those bills. Don't leave all
those on her").
1204 [92:1165
MODERNIZING MEDICARE
Abusive marketing degrades the quality of health care
available to Medicare patients. While congressional attention to
predatory marketing is commendable, legislators should incor-
porate more stringent protections for Medicare patients. Com-
munity health is an asset, and nothing is more valuable to in-
dividuals than health. 276 Medicare incorporates the American
values of consumer choice and social concern for our nation's
sickest patients. As the program struggles and adapts to ac-
commodate an aging baby-boomer population, the original vi-
sion and purpose of Medicare must be advanced through fair
and honest interactions with beneficiaries that protect accessi-
ble medical care.
276. Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919).
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